

Political Science 377
Nuclear Weapons and World Politics

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Course Description

This course will introduce the student to the politics of nuclear weapons. The course will cover the origins of nuclear weapons, the reasons states seek them, the strategies developed for their use, the consequences of their development, and efforts to control and reverse their spread. In addressing these issues we will study a variety of countries, including North Korea, India and Pakistan, Israel, Iraq and Iran.

Basic Information

Classroom: Ingraham 22
Time: Monday and Wednesday 9:55-10:45 am

Professor: Andrew Kydd
Email: kydd@wisc.edu
Office: 322c North Hall
Office Hours: Monday, 1:00 pm to 3:00 pm

Teaching Assistants:	Ryan Powers	Dillon Laaker
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Office:	122 North Hall	122 North Hall
Office Hours:	Tuesday, 9:50 to 11:50 am	Thursday, 8:30 to 10:30

Course Requirements

The final grade will be based on the following five elements.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Percent of Final Grade</u>
Section Participation	30%
Paper	
Paper Outline	5%
First Draft	10%
Final Draft	15%
Final Exam	40%

The grading scheme is the following.

A	93-100
AB	88-92
B	83-87
BC	78-82
C	70-77
D	60-69
F	0-59

Numerical scores will be rounded to integers using the usual convention, so that 87.5 will be rounded up to 88 and therefore get an AB, whereas 87.4 will be rounded down to 87 and get a B.

Discussion Sections

Class participation will be structured around weekly debates on topics that are related to the readings for the week. Participation will be graded on a scale from zero to four, with two points for attendance, one point for contribution to the discussion and an additional point for particularly active or constructive participation.

The Research Paper

Each student will write a research paper of around 4,000 words. The paper should take a question or topic we cover in class, present the relevant theoretical arguments, and then consider a specific empirical case in light of these arguments. For instance, the question could be, “does nuclear proliferation make war more or less likely?” and the case could be the relationship between India and Pakistan. Another example could be, “will any more countries voluntarily give up nuclear weapons?” and the cases could be France and Great Britain. The papers need to start with a topic from the course and the readings related to that topic, but must then make use of at least three substantial sources not on the syllabus.

You should start thinking about your research paper as soon as possible. Scan down the syllabus to look for topics that are interesting and do a little advance reading to investigate them. In order to make sure that your paper is off to a good start, a one page summary of your project is due at the time noted on the course schedule. This should identify the topic and question you wish to ask, the readings from the syllabus that are relevant, and some ideas on additional sources to look at. Your TA will provide feedback on the summary that will help refine your research plan.

All written work must have a title page including the title of the document (your project title), your name, the date, the name of the class, the professor and TA’s names, and the type of assignment it is, (one page prospectus, or final paper). The pages must be numbered. References are to be done with American Political Science Association (APSA) system. Check out the writing center for information: <http://www.writing.wisc.edu/Handbook/DocAPSA.html>. Make sure to cite specific page

numbers so the reader can easily find the source for what you are saying. The last page in the document should be the reference list. For information on writing and formatting references, see the UW Writing Center website, particularly, their writer's handbook, where you can find information about proper citing.

<http://www.writing.wisc.edu/Handbook/index.html>

All documents must be submitted to the appropriate dropbox on the Canvas site for the course. The name of the document must be your last name, followed by P for the paper proposal and 1 for the first draft and 2 for the final draft, followed by the relevant document suffix. For instance, Smith's proposal would be named SmithP.docx.

The papers will be due at the end of the semester at the time noted on the course schedule. Details on the grading criteria can be found in a separate document called *Final Paper Grading Standards*.

The Final Exam

The final exam will consist of a number of questions that require written answers of a few paragraphs. The exam will cover the entire course and will be closed book.

The exam location has not yet been scheduled, an announcement will be made in class when we find out.

Academic Integrity

The papers and exams in this course must be the student's work alone. Information on how to properly cite sources and avoid plagiarism can be found on the UW Writing Center website. Exams are closed book. Any suspected cases of plagiarism or cheating on exams will be referred to the Dean of Students office.

Learning Disabilities

Students with learning disabilities should contact the McBurney Center for guidance.

<http://mcburney.wisc.edu>

Readings

There will be two books available at the bookstore for the course.

Brown, Michael E., Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. 2010. *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sagan, Scott S., and Kenneth Waltz. 2012. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, A Debate Renewed (Third Edition)*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

The rest of the readings are available on-line at the Canvas website for the course.

Course Schedule: Spring Semester 2017

Module	Event	Day	Date	Month
Module 1: Nuclear Weapons and How to Get Them	Lecture 1.1 Introduction	Wednesday	18	January
	Lecture 1.2 Physics	Monday	23	
	Lecture 1.3 Aid and Bureaucracy	Wednesday	25	
Module 2: Why States Build Nuclear Weapons	Lecture 2.1 Three Models	Monday	30	February
	Lecture 2.2 India and Pakistan 1	Wednesday	1	
	Lecture 2.3 India and Pakistan 2	Monday	6	
	Lecture 2.4 Spiral vs. Deterrence	Wednesday	8	
	Lecture 2.5 North Korea	Monday	13	
	Lecture 2.6 Unit Level Theories	Wednesday	15	
	Lecture 2.7 Argentina and Brazil	Monday	20	
Module 3: The Consequences Of Nuclear Proliferation	Lecture 3.1 Arms Races and War Paper Topic Due (Noon)	Wednesday	22	March
	Lecture 3.2 Sagan/Waltz Debate	Monday	27	
	Lecture 3.3 India and Pakistan 3	Wednesday	1	
	Lecture 3.4 Iraq	Monday	6	
	Lecture 3.5 China	Wednesday	8	
	Lecture 3.6 Nuclear Terrorism	Monday	13	
Module 4: Nuclear Strategy	Lecture 4.1 The First Use	Wednesday	15	March
	Spring Break	Monday	20	
		Wednesday	22	
	Lecture 4.2 Dr. Strangelove	Monday	27	April
	Lecture 4.3 Nuclear Strategy	Wednesday	29	
	Lecture 4.4 US/Russia	Monday	3	
	Lecture 4.5 China/Pakistan	Wednesday	5	
	Lecture 4.5 Missile Defense First Draft Due (Noon)	Monday	10	
Lecture 4.6 The Nuclear Taboo	Wednesday	12		
Module 5: Arms Control	Lecture 5.1 Arms Control Theory	Monday	17	April
	Lecture 5.2 Superpower AC	Wednesday	19	
	Lecture 5.3 NPT and the CTBT	Monday	24	
	Lecture 5.4 FSU and South Africa	Wednesday	26	
	Lecture 5.5 Libya and Iran	Monday	1	
	Lecture 5.6 Nuclear Abolition	Wednesday	3	
Finishing Up	Final Draft Due (Noon)	Friday	5	May
	Final Exam Time: 2:45 to 4:45 pm Location: TBA	Tuesday	9	

Lectures and Readings:

Module 1: Nuclear Weapons and How to Get Them

Lecture 1.1 Introduction

Lecture 1.2 The Physics of Nuclear Weapons

Lecture 1.3 Scientific Cooperation and Bureaucratic Competence

Fuhrmann, Matthew. 2009. Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. In Brown et al.

Hymans, Jacques E. C. 2012. *Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians and Proliferation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 3.

Module 2: Why States Build Nuclear Weapons

Lecture 2.1 Three Models

Sagan, Scott D. Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb. In Brown et al.

Monteiro, Nuno and Alexandre Debs. 2014. The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation. *International Security*, Vol. 39, No. 2 pp. 7-51.

Lecture 2.2 Case: India and Pakistan

Ganguly, Sumit. 1999. India's Pathways to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program. In Brown et al.

Lecture 2.3 Case: India and Pakistan 2

Ahmed, Samina. 1999. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices. In Brown et al.

Lecture 2.4 The Spiral Model vs. the Deterrence Model

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Ch. 3. (pp. 58-113).

Lecture 2.5 Case: North Korea

Hill, Christopher R. 2013. The Elusive Vision of a Non-Nuclear North Korea. *The Washington Quarterly* 36(2), pp. 7-19.

Fitzpatrick, Mark. 2013. North Korea: Is Regime Change the Answer? *Survival* 55(3), pp. 7-20.

Kydd, Andrew. 2015. Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification? *The Washington Quarterly* 38(2): 63-77.

Lecture 2.6 The Unit Level Perspective

Solingen, Etel. 1994. The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint. In Brown et al.

Lecture 2.7 Cases: Argentina and Brazil

Hymans, Jacques E. C. 2001. Of Gauchos and Gringos: Why Argentina Never Wanted the Bomb and Why the United States Thought it Did. *Security Studies* 10 (3):153-85.

Module 3: The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation

Lecture 3.1 Have Arms Races Caused War?

Kennedy, Paul. 1984. Arms Races and the Causes of War: 1850-1945, in Kennedy, Paul, *Strategy and Diplomacy*. Fontana Press: 165-177.

Lecture 3.2 Is Nuclear Proliferation Good or Bad?

Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2012. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (Third Edition)*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Chapters 1 and 2.

Mueller, John. 1988. The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar

World. *International Security* 13 (2):55-79.

Lecture 3.3 India and Pakistan

Sagan and Waltz, Chapters 3-5.

Ganguly, Sumit. 2008. Nuclear Stability in South Asia. In Brown et al.

Kapur, S. Paul. 2008. Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia. In Brown et al.

Lecture 3.4 Preventive War I: Iraq

Bush, George W. 2002. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington D.C.: White House.

Lecture 3.5 Preventive War II: China

Burr, William, and Jeffrey T. Richelson. 2000. Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64. *International Security* 25 (3):54-99.

Lecture 3.6 Terrorism

Bunn, Matthew. 2010. Nuclear Terrorism: A Strategy for Prevention. In Brown et al.

Lieber, Keir A. and Daryl G. Press. 2013. Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists. *International Security* 38 (1), pp. 80-104.

Module 4: Nuclear Strategy: Use, Non-Use, Deterrence and Defense

Lecture 4.1 The First Use

Wilson, Ward. 2007. The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in the Light of Hiroshima. *International Security* 31 (4):162-79.

Lecture 4.2 Dr. Strangelove and Nuclear Deterrence

Movie: Dr. Strangelove

Lecture 4.3 Classical Nuclear Strategy

Sagan, Scott D. 1989. *Moving Targets: Nuclear Weapons and National Security* Princeton University Press.

Lecture 4.4 The US and Russia

Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl Press. 2006. The End of Mad? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy. *International Security* 30 (4):7-44.

Lecture 4.5 China and Pakistan

Christensen, Thomas J. 2012. The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations. *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 35(4): 447-487.

Goldstein, Avery. 2013. First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations. *International Security* 37(4):49-89.

Narang, Vipin. 2009/10. Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability. *International Security* 34 (3):38-78.

Lecture 4.6 National Missile Defense

Keith B. Payne. 2000. The Case for National Missile Defense. *Orbis* 44(2):187-196.

Miller Steven E. 2001. The Flawed Case for Missile Defense. *Survival* 43(3):95-109.

Lecture 4.7 Taboo or Not Taboo?

Tannenwald, Nina. 1999. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use. *International Organization* 53 (3):433-468.

Daryl G. Press, Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino. 2013. Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. *American Political Science Review* 107(1): 188-206.

Module 5: Arms Control

Lecture 5.1 Arms Control Theory

Adler, Emanuel. 1992. The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control. *International Organization* 46 (1):101-145.

Lecture 5.2 Superpower Arms Control

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1991. Did "Peace Through Strength" End the Cold War: Lessons From INF. *International Security* 16 (1):162-188.

Lecture 5.3 The NPT and CTBT

Gavin, Francis J. 2004. Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s. *International Security* 29 (3):100-135.

Lecture 5.4 Giving up the Bomb: FSU, South Africa

Liberman, Peter. 2001. The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb. *International Security* 26(2):45-86. In Brown et al.

Levite, Ariel E. 2002. Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited. *International Security* 27 (3):59-88. In Brown et al.

Lecture 5.5 Libya and Iran

Jentleson, Bruce W., and Christopher A. Whytock. 2005. Who "Won" Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy. *International Security* 30 (3):47-86.

Samore, Gary. 2015. The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.

Lecture 5.6 Nuclear Abolition

Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. January 4, 2007. A World Free of Nuclear Weapons. *The Wall St. Journal*.

Daalder, Ivo, and Jan Lodol. 2008. The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons. *Foreign Affairs* 87 (6):80-95.

Glaser, Charles L. 1998. The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament. *Survival* 40 (1):112-28.

Blechman, Barry, and Alex Bolfrass. 2010. 5 Myths About Getting Rid of the Bomb. *The Washington Post*, June 27, 2010.